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Abstract
This paper identifies a manifold in the space of bimatrix games which contains games that
are strategically equivalent to rank-1 games through a positive affine transformation. It also
presents an algorithm that can compute, in polynomial time, one such rank-1 game which is
strategically equivalent to the original game. Through this approach, we substantially expand
the class of games that are solvable in polynomial time. It is hoped that this approach can be
further developed in conjunction with other notions of strategic equivalence to compute exact
or approximate Nash equilibria in a wide variety of bimatrix games.
∗The author is with the ECE department at OSU. The author was fully supported by the United States
Military Academy and the Army Advanced Civil Schooling (ACS) program
1 Introduction
The study of game theory – the model of strategic interaction between rational agents – has wide
ranging applicability within the fields of economics, engineering, and computer science. Computing
a Nash equilibrium (NE) in a k-player finite game is one of the fundamental problems in game
theory.1 Due to the well known theorem by Nash in 1951, we know that every finite game has a
solution, possibly in mixed strategies [1]. However, computation of a NE has been shown to be
hard. For k ≥ 3, [2, 3] proved that computing a NE is Polynomial Parity Argument, Directed
Version (PPAD) complete. Indeed, even the 2-player case has been shown to be PPAD-complete
[4].
In this work we focus on finite, 2-player bimatrix games in which the payoffs to the players can
be represented as two matrices, A and B. With the hardness of computing a NE in the bimatrix
case well established, identifying classes of games whose solutions can be computed efficiently is
an active area of research. As an example in bimatrix games, one can compute the solution of
zero-sum games2 in polynomial time using the minimax theorem and a simple linear program [5,
p. 152]. Another subclass of games that admits a polynomial time solution is the class of strategically
zero-sum games introduced by Moulin and Vial in 1978 [6].
More recently, in a series of works [7, 8] the authors have developed polynomial time algorithms
for solving another subclass of bimatrix games called rank-1 games. Rank-1 games are defined as
games where the sum of the two payoff matrices is a rank-1 matrix. Here we note that this subclass
lies in a space of Rm×n+m+n.
We say that two games, G and G′, are strategically equivalent if the optimal strategies of every
player in G corresponds to the optimal strategies of every player in G′.3 Unfortunately, many
operations that preserve the strategic equivalence of bimatrix games modify the rank of the game.
For example, the well studied constant-sum game is strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game.
However, the zero-sum game has rank zero, while the constant-sum game is a rank-1 game. Since
the rank of a game influences the most suitable solution technique one should be particularly
interested in determining if a given game G′ is strategically equivalent to a game G, where the rank
of G is less than the rank of G′.
In this contribution, we do just that. We show that, in polynomial time, it is possible to
determine if the game G′ lies in a manifold of size Rm×n+2m+2n+4. If so, we show that the game
G′ is strategically equivalent to some rank-1 game G. Furthermore, we show that one can also
calculate this rank-1 game in polynomial time. As we will show, our algorithm is surprisingly
straightforward and significantly expands the space of games which can be solved in polynomial
time.
1.1 Prior Work
Many papers in the literature have explored the concept of equivalent classes of games. One such
concept is strategic equivalence, those games that share exactly the same set of NE. Indeed, for a
classical example, von Neumann and Morgenstern studied strategically equivalent n-person zero-
sum games [5, p. 245] and constant-sum games [5, p. 346].
Closely related to our work is the class of strategically zero-sum games defined by Moulin and
Vial in [6]. For the bimatrix case, they provide a complete characterization of strategically zero-
sum games [6, Theorem 2]. While the authors do not analyze the algorithmic implications of their
1Nash equilibrium is an acceptable and a widely used solution concept for games; we define it later in the paper.
2A game is called a zero-sum game if the sum of payoffs of the players is zero for all actions of the players.
3See Section 2 for a formal definition and the specific form of strategic equivalence that we study in this work.
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characterization, Kontogiannis and Spirakis do analyze the approach in their work on mutually
concave games. They find that the characterization in [6, Theorem 2] can determine whether a
bimatrix game is strategically zero-sum, and, if so, calculate an equivalent zero-sum game in time
O(m3n3).
In [9], Kontogiannis and Spirakis formulate a quadratic program where the optimal solutions
of the quadratic program constitute a subset of the correlated equilibria of a bimatrix game. Fur-
thermore, they then show that this subset of correlated equilibria are exactly the NE of the game.
In order to show polynomial tractability of the quadratic program, they define a class of mutually
concave bimatrix games. Surprisingly, they find that their characterization of mutually concave
bimatrix games is equivalent to Moulin and Vial’s characterization of strategically zero-sum bima-
trix games [9, Corollary 2]. They then propose a parameterized version of the Mangasarian and
Stone quadratic program that is guaranteed to be convex for a mutually concave game and has
time complexity O(n3.5) for 2 ≤ m ≤ n [9, Theorem 2]. With the problem of solving a mutually
concave game shown to be tractable, the authors then proceed to show that recognizing a mutually
concave game can be done in time O(m2n).
As far as we are aware, no other authors have specifically studied games that are strategically
equivalent to rank-1 games. With the recently developed fast algorithms [7, 8] for solving rank-1
games, now seems like an appropriate time to do just that.
1.2 Our Contribution
Given a nonzero-sum bimatrix game, (m,n, A˜, B˜) ∈ Qm×n×Qm×n, we develop the SER1 algorithm
that determines whether or not the given game lies in a manifold of size Qm×n+2m+2n+4. If so, then
the game is strategically equivalent to some rank-1 game (m,n,A,−A+ rcT). Our approach relies
on the classical linear algebra result known as the Wedderburn Rank Reduction Theorem and the
theory of matrix pencils. However, we show that it is possible to avoid many of the traditional
solution concepts applied to matrix pencils and determine if there exists a solution such that the
pencil is a rank-1 pencil via solving a single quadratic expression. Thus, our approach is surprisingly
simple and leads to an amazingly fast algorithm. In Section 5 we show that both the determination
of strategic equivalence and the computation of the strategically equivalent rank-1 game can be
done in time O(mn+M(L)), where L is the bit-length of the largest absolute value of entries in
(A˜, B˜), and M(L) is the complexity of multiplication. This equivalent rank-1 game can then be
solved in polynomial time [7, 8]. Since the two games are strategically equivalent, the NE strategies
of the equivalent rank-1 game are exactly the NE strategies of the original nonzero-sum bimatrix
game (m,n, A˜, B˜).
We thus show a significant expansion to the class of bimatrix games that can be solved in
polynomial time.
An astute observer whom is familiar with the field would likely recognize that our problem can
easily subsume the strategically zero-sum case. However, with multiple existing polynomial time
algorithms for that case [6, 9, 10], we choose to specifically focus on strategically equivalent rank-1
games.
1.3 Notation
We use 1n and 0n to denote, respectively, the all ones and all zeros vectors of length n. All vectors
are annotated by bold font, e.g u, and all vectors are treated as column vectors. ∆n is the set of
probability distributions over {1, . . . , n}, where ∆n =
{
p | pi ≥ 0,∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
∑n
i=1 pi = 1
}
.
Let ej, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, denote the vector with 1 in the j
th position and 0’s elsewhere.
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Consider a matrix C. We use rank(C) to indicate the rank of the matrix C. ColSpan(C)
indicates the subspace spanned by the columns of the matrix C, also known as the column space
of the matrix C. We indicate the nullspace of the matrix C, the space containing all solutions to
Cx = 0m, as null(C). In addition, we use C
(j) to denote the jth column of C and C(i) to denote
the ith row of C.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we recall some basic definitions in bimatrix games and the definition of strategic
equivalence in bimatrix games.
We consider here a two player game, in which player 1 (the row player) has m actions and player
2 (the column player) has n actions. Player 1’s set of pure strategies is denoted by S1 = {1, . . . ,m}
and player 2’s set of pure strategies is S2 = {1, . . . , n}. If the players play pure strategies (i, j) ∈
S1 × S2, then player 1 receives a payoff of ai,j and player 2 receives bi,j.
We let A = [ai,j ] ∈ R
m×n represent the payoff matrix of player 1 and B = [bi,j] ∈ R
m×n represent
the payoff matrix of player 2. As the two-player finite game can be represented by two matrices,
this game is commonly referred to as a bimatrix game. The bimatrix game is then defined by the
tuple (m,n,A,B). Define the m× n matrix C as the sum of the two payoff matrices, C := A+B.
We define the rank of a game as rank(C).4
Players may also play mixed strategies, which correspond to a probability distribution over the
available set of pure strategies. Player 1 has mixed strategies p and player 2 has mixed strategies
q, where p ∈ ∆m and q ∈ ∆n. Using the notation introduced above, player 1 has expected payoff
pTAq and player 2 has expected payoff pTBq.
A Nash Equilibrium is defined as a tuple of strategies (p∗,q∗) such that each player’s strategy
is an optimal response to the other player’s strategy. In other words, neither player can benefit,
in expectation, by unilaterally deviating from the Nash Equilibrium. This is made precise in the
following definition.
Definition 1 (Nash Equilibrium [1]). We refer to the pair of strategies (p∗,q∗) as a Nash Equi-
librium (NE) if and only if:
p∗TAq∗ ≥ pTAq∗ ∀ p ∈ ∆m; p
∗TBq∗ ≥ p∗TBq ∀ q ∈ ∆n.
It is a well known fact due to Nash [1] that every bimatrix game with finite set of pure strategies
has at least one NE in mixed strategies. However, one can define games in which multiple NE exist
in mixed strategies. Let Φ : Rm×n × Rm×n ⇒ ∆m ×∆n be the Nash equilibrium correspondence
5:
Given the matrices (A,B), Φ(A,B) ⊂ ∆m × ∆n denotes the set of all Nash equilibria of the
game (m,n,A,B). Note that due to the result in [1], Φ(A,B) is nonempty for every (A,B) ∈
Rm×n × Rm×n.
We say that two games are strategically equivalent if both games have the same set of players,
the same set of strategies per player, and the same set of Nash equilibria. The following definition
formalizes this concept.
Definition 2. The 2-player finite games (m,n,A,B) and (m,n, A˜, B˜) are strategically equivalent
iff Φ(A,B) = Φ(A˜, B˜).
4Some authors define the rank of the game to be the maximum of the rank of the two matrices A and B, but this
is not the case here.
5A correspondence is a set valued map [11, p. 555].
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We now have a well known Lemma on strategic equivalence in bimatrix games that is typically
stated without proof.6 For completeness, the proof is in Appendix A.
Lemma 1. Let A,B ∈ Rm×n be two matrices. Let A˜ = α1A + β11mu
T and B˜ = α2B + β2v1
T
n
where β1, β2 ∈ R, α1, α2 ∈ R>0, u ∈ R
n, and v ∈ Rm. Then the game (m,n,A,B) is strategically
equivalent to (m,n, A˜, B˜).
3 Problem Formulation and Main Results
From Lemma 1, we conclude that if there exists β1, β2 ∈ R, α1, α2 ∈ R>0, u ∈ R
n, and v ∈ Rm such
that:
A˜ = α1A+ β11mu
T, (1)
B˜ = −α2A+ α2rc
T + β2v1
T
n (2)
then (m,n, A˜, B˜) is strategically equivalent to the rank-1 game (m,n,A,−A + rcT) via a positive
affine transformation (PAT). Here we note that there may be other transforms, even nonlinear
transforms, which maintain the set of NE for a specific game. We don’t consider those transforms
and focus on the class of PATs. Throughout this work, any mention of strategic equivalence refers
to strategic equivalence via a PAT.
Combining (1) and (2), we have:
A˜ = −
α1
α2
B˜ + α1rc
T + β11mu
T +
α1
α2
β2v1
T
n . (3)
Defining γ := α1
α2
, D := β11mu
T + γβ2v1
T
n , and rˆcˆ
T := α1rc
T, we rewrite (3) as:
A˜+ γB˜ = β11mu
T + γβ2v1
T
n + α1rc
T = D + rˆcˆT. (4)
In addition, let us define C˜(γ) := A˜+ γB˜ and the subspace Mm×n(R), which we define as
Mm×n(R) =
{
M ∈ Rm×n
∣∣∣ there exists u ∈ Rn, and v ∈ Rm such that M = 1muT + v1Tn
}
.
From (4), it is clear that if (m,n, A˜, B˜) is strategically equivalent to the rank-1 game (m,n,A,−A+
rcT) via a PAT, then there exists a γ ∈ R>0 such that rank(C˜(γ)) ≤ 3. However, while rank(C˜(γ)) ≤
3 is a necessary condition, it is not sufficient. For sufficiency, we also require the existence of
D ∈ Mm×n(R), rˆ ∈ R
m, and cˆ ∈ Rn such that C˜(γ) = D + rˆcˆT.7
Thus, what we have shown above is the following result:
Proposition 2. (m,n, A˜, B˜) is strategically equivalent to (m,n,A,−A+rcT) through a PAT if and
only if C˜(γ) = D + rˆcˆT, where D ∈ Mm×n(R).
Proof. The proof follows from the preceding discussions.
In what follows, we show the converse holds. Furthermore, in Section 4 we devise methods
for determining γ, D, and C˜(γ). Finally, in Section 5 we construct an algorithm that efficiently
implements the results from Section 4.
For a matrix M , decompose it in a manner such that M = D + K, where D ∈ Mm×n and
K 6∈ Mm×n. Let g(M) denote the matrix K. This function can be computed efficiently.
6See e.g [6, 9].
7By the definition of D, we have 0 ≤ rank(D) ≤ 2. This implies that 1 ≤ rank(C˜(γ)) ≤ 3.
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Assumption 3. The game (m,n, A˜, B˜) satisfies
1. D ∈ Mm×n ∀γ ∈ R>0.
2. g(C˜(γ∗)) is a rank-1 matrix.
Theorem 4. If Assumption 3 holds, then there exists a matrix Aˆ ∈ Rm×n and vectors rˆ ∈ Rm,
cˆ ∈ Rn such that the bimatrix game (m,n, A˜, B˜) is strategically equivalent to the rank-1 game
(m,n, Aˆ,−Aˆ+ rˆcˆT).
Proof. This result is a direct consequence of Theorem 6 presented in Subsection 4.1 and Theorem
19 presented in Appendix C.
We briefly note here that, even if one were to be given A, r, c, and a game (m,n, A˜, B˜)
that is strategically equivalent to (m,n,A,−A + rcT) it would be impossible to exactly recover
A, r, c without also knowing β1, β2, α1, α2,u, and v. Thus, our technique calculates another
game, (m,n, Aˆ,−Aˆ + rˆcˆT) which is rank-1 and strategically equivalent to both (m,n, A˜, B˜) and
(m,n,A,−A+ rcT).
Let us now turn our attention to showing the necessary conditions under which Assumption 3
holds true and devising methods to test those conditions.
4 Proof of the Main Result
In this section, we prove the main theoretical results presented in Section 3. Let us now turn our
attention to decomposing the game via the Wedderburn Rank Reduction Formula.
4.1 Reducing the Rank of a Game via the Wedderburn Rank Reduction Formula
In this subsection, we show that if there exists a γ ∈ R>0 such that rank(C˜) = 3 where C˜ :=
C˜(γ) = A˜+ γB˜, then it may be possible, under certain conditions, to calculate a rank-1 game that
is strategically equivalent to the rank-k game (m,n, A˜, B˜). In what follows, we first present the
Wedderburn Rank Reduction formula upon which our technique is based, and then we proceed to
state our result, leaving the proof to Appendix C.1.
The Wedderburn Rank Reduction formula is a classical technique in linear algebra that allows
one to reduce the rank of a matrix by subtracting a specifically formulated rank-1 matrix. By
repeated applications of the formula, one can obtain a matrix decomposition as the sum of multiple
rank-1 matrices. 8
We now proceed to state Wedderburn’s original theorem. Following that, we show how one can
exploit the flexibility of the decomposition to extract specifically formulated rank-1 matrices that
allow us, when certain conditions hold true, to reduce the rank of a bimatrix game.
Theorem 5 ([12, p. 69] [13]). Let C ∈ Rm×n be an arbitrary matrix, not identically zero. Then,
there exists vectors x1 ∈ R
n and y1 ∈ R
m such that w1 = y
T
1Cx1 6= 0. Then, setting C = C1 for
convenience, the matrix
C2 := C1 − w
−1
1 C1x1y
T
1C1 (5)
has rank exactly one less than the rank of C.
8For further reading on the Wedderburn rank reduction formula, we refer the reader to Wedderburn’s original
book [12, p. 69], or to the excellent treatment of the topic by Chu et al. [13].
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Proof. The original proof of (5) is due to Wedderburn [12, p. 69]. See Appendix B for our restated
version.
Let us now proceed to show how one can apply Theorem 5 in order to reduce the rank of a
bimatrix game. For ease of exposition, we break the result into two theorems–Theorem 6 and
Theorem 19 (presented in Appendix C).
Theorem 6. Consider the game (m,n, A˜, B˜). If there exists γ ∈ R>0 such that C˜ := C˜(γ) =
A˜ + γB˜ = D + rˆcˆT where D ∈ Mm×n(R) with rank(D) = 2, rank(C˜) = 3, rˆ ∈ R
m, cˆ ∈ Rn, then
there exists x1,x2 ∈ R
n and y1,y2 ∈ R
m such that:
1. C˜x1 = 1m and w1 = y
T
1 C˜x1 6= 0. Let uˆ
T = w−11 y
T
1 C˜ and compute C˜2 using (5) as follows:
C˜2 = C˜ − w
−1
1 C˜x1y
T
1 C˜ = C˜ − 1muˆ
T.
2. y2C˜2 = 1
T
n and w2 = y
T
2 C˜2x2 6= 0. Let vˆ = w
−1
2 C˜2x2 and compute C˜3 using (5) as follows:
C˜3 = C˜2 − w
−1
2 C˜2x2y
T
2 C˜2 = C˜ − vˆ1
T
n = C˜ − 1muˆ
T − vˆ1Tn .
Define Aˆ = A˜ − 1muˆ
T and Bˆ = γB˜ − vˆ1Tn . Then, Aˆ + Bˆ = C˜3 = rˆcˆ
T and the bimatrix game
(m,n, A˜, B˜) is strategically equivalent to the rank-1 game (m,n, Aˆ, Bˆ).
Proof. See Appendix C.
In Theorem 6 we assumed the existence of γ such that C˜ is in our desired form. In the next
subsection, we show an efficient decomposition of C˜ that we can conduct without knowing γ.
Following that, we then show a technique for solving for such a γ (if it exists).
4.2 An Efficient Decomposition of C˜
First-off, let us assume that there exists a γ such that C˜(γ) = M +D, where D ∈ Mm×n(R) with
rank(D) = 2. See Appendix D for the cases of rank(D) < 2. Therefore, we know that there exists
a vector x1 such that C˜x1 = 1m and a y2 such that y2C˜2 = 1
T
n . Examining Theorem 6, we see
that the term x1 always appears as a term in the matrix-vector product C˜x1. Therefore, we can
replace all appearances of the term C˜x1 with 1m and there is no need to explicitly calculate x1.
An algorithmic efficient manner for selecting y1 is to let y1 = ei for some i. Then we have that:
w−11 =
1
yT1 C˜x1
=
1
eTi 1m
= 1.
Then, we also have:
1muˆ
T = w−11 C˜x1y
T
1 C˜ = 1me
T
i C˜ = 1me
T
i (A˜+ γB˜)
= (1mA˜(i) + γ1mB˜(i)).
Then we have that C˜2 = A˜+ γB˜ − (1mA˜(i) + γ1mB˜(i)). Then, letting y2C˜2 = 1
T
n and x2 = ej, we
have w−12 = 1 and
vˆ1Tn = C˜2ej1
T
n = [A˜+ γB˜ − (1mA˜(i) + γ1mB˜(i))]ej1
T
n
= (A˜(j) − 1ma˜i,j)1
T
n + γ(B˜
(j) − 1mb˜i,j)1
T
n .
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Therefore, we have
C˜3 = A˜+ γB˜ − (1mA˜(i) + γ1mB˜(i))−
(
(A˜(j) − 1ma˜i,j)1
T
n + γ(B˜
(j) − 1mb˜i,j)1
T
n
)
. (6)
For notational simplicity, let D(γ) := (1mA˜(i)+γ1mB˜(i))−
(
(A˜(j)−1ma˜i,j)1
T
n+γ(B˜
(j)−1mb˜i,j)1
T
n
)
and A¯+ γB¯ := C˜3. Clearly, we have D(γ) ∈ Mm×n(R) for all γ ∈ R.
Theorem 7. Consider the game (m,n, A˜, B˜), select any (i, j) ∈ {1 . . . m} × {1 . . . n}, and formu-
late A¯ + γB¯ := C˜3 as in (6). Let Aˆ(γ) = A˜ − (1mA˜(i) + γ1mB˜(i)) and Bˆ(γ) = γB˜ −
(
(A˜(j) −
1ma˜i,j)1
T
n + γ(B˜
(j) − 1mb˜i,j)1
T
n
)
. If there exists γ∗ ∈ R>0 such that rank(A¯+ γ
∗B¯) = 1, then the
game (m,n, A˜, B˜) is strategically equivalent to the rank-1 game (m,n, Aˆ(γ∗), Bˆ(γ∗)).
Proof. The proof follows from the preceding discussion and Theorem 6.
Thus, what we’ve shown is that our problem is equivalent to forming a rather simple matrix
decomposition to calculate D(γ), and then determining whether there exists a scalar parameter γ∗
such that rank(A¯+ γ∗B¯) = 1. Let us now turn our attention to the theory of matrix pencils and
develop an efficient procedure for calculating γ∗.
4.3 Rank-1 Matrix Pencils
We would be remiss if we did not mention that fact that problems in the form A + λB, with
A,B ∈ Rm×n matrices of known values and λ ∈ C an unknown scalar parameter, are typically
referred to as linear matrix pencils (or just pencils)[14, p. 24],[15]. Therefore, our problem of
finding a γ∗ ∈ R such that rank(C˜(γ∗)) = 1 is intimately connected to the theory of matrix pencils
and the generalized eigenvalues of matrix pencils. However, we eschew the traditional techniques
for solving matrix pencils in order to avoid the higher than necessary computational complexity
and possible numerical difficulties. Instead, in this subsection, we develop a series of results that
allow us to determine whether or not there exists a λ∗ ∈ C such that rank(A+ λ∗B) = 1 by solving
for the roots of a single polynomial equation (at worse a quadratic) and then conducting at most
two matrix comparisons.
Let us begin by stating some facts about rank-1 matrices that will allow us to easily ascertain
when a given matrix is rank-1 and to solve for values of λ∗, when they exist, such that the matrix
pencil, A+ λ∗B, is a rank-1 pencil.
Fact 1. The matrix M in Rm×n is rank-1 if and only if M 6= 0m×n and the following hold true:
1. Every row (column) of M is a scalar multiple of every other row (column) of M .
2. Choose any element mi,j of M such that mij 6= 0 and form rj =M
(j), cTi = m
−1
i,jM(i). Then,
M = rjc
T
i .
Theorem 8. Given the matrix pencil, A+ λB, with A,B ∈ Rm×n, assume that A,B 6= 0m×n and
rank(A+B) > 1. Construct λ-vectors rj(λ) and ci(λ) as follows:
1. Choose any (i, j) ∈ {1 . . . n}×{1 . . . m} such that ai,j 6= 0. Such an ai,j is guaranteed to exist
since A 6= 0m×n.
2. Let rj(λ) = A
(j) + λB(j).
3. Let ci(λ)
T = 1
ai,j+λbi,j
(A(i) + λB(i)).
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Then there exists λ∗ ∈ C such that rank(A+ λ∗B) = 1 if and only if either:
1. bi,j 6= 0 and rank(A+
−ai,j
bi,j
B) = 1; or
2. A+ λ∗B = rj(λ
∗)ci(λ
∗)T.
Proof. We first prove the forward direction. Suppose there exists λ∗ ∈ C such that rank(A+ λ∗B) =
1. We split the proof of the forward direction into two cases:
Case λ∗ =
−ai,j
bi,j
: Suppose that λ∗ =
−ai,j
bi,j
. Since λ∗ ∈ C, this implies bi,j 6= 0. Furthermore,
rank(A+ λ∗B) = 1 and λ∗ =
−ai,j
bi,j
implies rank(A+
−ai,j
bi,j
B) = 1. In addition, note that λ∗ =
−ai,j
bi,j
implies that ci(λ
∗) is undefined; therefore, the expression A + λ∗B = rj(λ
∗)ci(λ
∗)T is undefined
and cannot hold true.
Case λ∗ 6=
−ai,j
bi,j
: Now, suppose λ∗ 6=
−ai,j
bi,j
. Then rank(A+
−ai,j
bi,j
B) 6= 1. Also, ai,j+λ
∗bi,j 6= 0,
so ci(λ
∗) is well-defined. Then A+ λ∗B = rj(λ
∗)ci(λ
∗)T follows from Fact 1.
We next prove the reverse direction. Suppose bi,j 6= 0 and rank(A+
−ai,j
bi,j
B) = 1. Then
λ∗ =
−ai,j
bi,j
∈ R ⊂ C and rank(A+ λ∗B) = 1. Of course, as in above, since ci(λ
∗)T is undefined at
λ∗ =
−ai,j
bi,j
by definition, we conclude that A+ λ∗B 6= rj(λ
∗)ci(λ
∗)T.
Now, suppose A+ λ∗B = rj(λ
∗)ci(λ
∗)T, which implies that ci(λ
∗) is well-defined. This implies
that bi,j = 0 and/or rank(A+
−ai,j
bi,j
B) 6= 1. Furthermore, since λ∗ is the solution to a system of
m×n linear or quadratic equations with real coefficients, we have λ∗ ∈ C. Then, rank(A+ λ∗B) = 1
follows from Fact 1.
Since it is rather trivial to determine whether or not bi,j 6= 0 and rank(A+
−ai,j
bi,j
B) = 1, we’ll
assume throughout the rest of this subsection that rank(A+
−ai,j
bi,j
B) 6= 1. Let us now examine the
matrix equality A+λB = rj(λ)ci(λ)
T, introduce some additional notation, and state some lemmas
that allow us to determine whether or not there exists a finite λ∗ such that rank(A+ λ∗B) = 1.
With rj(λ) and ci(λ) as defined in Theorem 8, let us write the following system of equations:
A+ λB = rj(λ)ci(λ)
T (7)


a1,1 + λb1,1 . . . a1,n + λb1,n
...
. . .
...
am,1 + λbm,1 . . . am,n + λbm,n

 =


(a1,j+λb1,j)(ai,1+λbi,1)
ai,j+λbi,j
. . .
(a1,j+λb1,j)(ai,n+λbi,n)
ai,j+λbi,j
...
. . .
...
(am,j+λbm,j)(ai,1+λbi,1)
ai,j+λbi,j
. . .
(am,j+λbm,j)(ai,n+λbi,n)
ai,j+λbi,j

 (8)
Since λ is a scalar variable, it is clear from (8) that (7) only has a solution (or possibly multiple
solutions), λ∗, if λ∗ simultaneously satisfies m × n single-variable polynomials, where each poly-
nomial is of degree at most 2. Thus, one could solve all m × n single-variable polynomials and
then check whether or not every solution has a common value. While this procedure is somewhat
efficient, we’ll show below that at most (m − 1) × (n − 1) of the polynomials have finite solutions
and therefore contribute any meaningful information. In addition, we’ll show that it is sufficient
to identify one polynomial that is not the zero polynomial and then conduct a matrix checking
problem for the solution(s) of that polynomial.
Let us now introduce notation for the polynomial represented by row s and column t in (8).
For (s, t) ∈ {1 . . . n} × {1 . . . m}, let
fs,t(i, j;λ) = as,t + λbs,t −
(as,j + λbs,j)(ai,t + λbi,t)
ai,j + λbi,j
(9)
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From (9), it is clear that when s = i or t = j, then fi,t(i, j;λ) and fs,j(i, j;λ) are the zero
polynomial. In other words, fs,t(i, j; λˆ) = 0 trivially holds true for all λˆ ∈ C for one entire column
and one entire row of (8). Since these m+ n− 1 expressions hold true for all λˆ ∈ C, they lend no
information for determining whether or not there exists λ∗ such that rank(A+ λ∗B) = 1. Thus,
we can disregard these m+ n− 1 polynomials and only consider the remaining (m− 1) × (n − 1)
polynomials. Let us now show that at least one of the remaining (m− 1)× (n− 1) polynomials is
not the zero polynomial. The proof of the Lemma is deferred to Appendix A.
Lemma 9. Let A,B ∈ Rm×n, and assume that A,B 6= 0m×n. Given the matrix pencil, A + λB,
construct λ-vectors rj(λ) and ci(λ) as in Theorem 8 and fs,t(i, j;λ) as in (9). If rank(A+B) > 1,
then there exists at least one pair (s, t) ∈ {1 . . . n} × {1 . . . m} such that fs,t(i, j;λ) is not the zero
polynomial.
Theorem 10. Let A,B ∈ Rm×n, and assume that A,B 6= 0m×n with rank(A+B) > 1. Given
the matrix pencil, A+ λB, construct λ-vectors rj(λ) and ci(λ) as in Theorem 8. Pick any (l, k) ∈
{1 . . . n} × {1 . . . m} such that fl,k(i, j;λ) is not the zero polynomial. Let λˆ1, λˆ2 be solutions to
fl,k(i, j;λ) = 0. Then, there exists λ
∗ ∈ C such that rank(A+ λ∗B) = 1 if and only if A + λˆ1B =
rj(λˆ1)ci(λˆ1)
T or/and A+ λˆ2B = rj(λˆ2)ci(λˆ2)
T.
Proof. Let us first note that, by Lemma 9, there exists at least one pair (l, k) ∈ {1 . . . n}×{1 . . . m}
such that fl,k(i, j;λ) is not the zero polynomial.
Now, suppose there exists λ∗ ∈ C such that rank(A+ λ∗B) = 1. Then, by Theorem 8, A +
λ∗B = rj(λ
∗)ci(λ
∗)T. Thus, fs,t(i, j;λ
∗) = 0 for all (s, t) ∈ {1 . . . n} × {1 . . . m}. In particular,
fl,k(i, j;λ
∗) = 0. Therefore, either λˆ1 = λ
∗ or/and λˆ2 = λ
∗. It then follows that A + λˆ1B =
rj(λˆ1)ci(λˆ1)
T or/and A+ λˆ2B = rj(λˆ2)ci(λˆ2)
T.
In the other direction, let λˆ1, λˆ2 be solutions to fl,k(i, j;λ) = 0. Note that fl,k(i, j;λ) = 0 may be
a linear equation. In that case, for simplicity, let λˆ1 = λˆ2. Now, suppose A+ λˆ1B = rj(λˆ1)ci(λˆ1)
T
and let λ∗ = λ1. Then A+ λ
∗B = rj(λ
∗)ci(λ
∗)T and rank(A+ λ∗B) = 1 by Theorem 8. The case
of A+ λˆ2B = rj(λˆ2)ci(λˆ2)
T is similar and therefore omitted.
Let us use Λ to represent the solution set obtained from Theorem 10. Note, Λ has a maximum
cardinality of 2 and may, of course, be empty.
Throughout the presentation in this subsection, we’ve assumed rank(A+B) > 1. For com-
pleteness, we present the next trivial lemma without proof.
Lemma 11. If rank(A+B) = 1, then λ∗ = 1 and rank(A+ λ∗B) = 1.
4.4 Solving for γ∗
Let us now present our main result for solving for γ∗ and calculating the equivalent rank-1 game.
Theorem 12. Consider the game (m,n, A˜, B˜) and formulate A¯ + λB¯, Aˆ(λ), and Bˆ(λ) as in
Theorem 7. Construct the set Λ as follows: If rank(A¯+ B¯) = 1, let Λ = {1}. Otherwise, construct
λ-vectors rj(λ) and ci(λ) as in Theorem 8. If bi,j 6= 0 and rank(A+
−ai,j
bi,j
B) = 1, let Λ = {
−ai,j
bi,j
}.
Otherwise, apply Theorem 10 to calculate the solution set Λ.
If there exists λ ∈ Λ such that λ ∈ R>0, then let γ
∗ equal such a λ. Then the game (m,n, A˜, B˜)
is strategically equivalent to the rank-1 game (m,n, Aˆ(γ∗), Bˆ(γ∗)).
Proof. The proof follows from Theorems 7, 8, 10, and Lemma 11.
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5 Algorithm for Strategically Equivalent Rank-1 Games (SER1)
We have shown that given the game (m,n, A˜, B˜), one can determine if the game is strategically
equivalent to the game (m,n,A,−A+ rcT) through a PAT. If so, then it is possible to construct a
rank-1 game which is strategically equivalent to the original game. One can then efficiently solve
the strategically equivalent rank-1 game via existing polynomial time algorithms [7, 8]. We state
the key steps in Algorithm 1 and show that both the determination of strategic equivalence and the
computation of the strategically equivalent rank-1 game can be done in time O(mn+M(L)), where
L is the bit-length of the largest absolute value of entries in (A˜, B˜), and M(L) is the complexity of
multiplication.
The analytical results and discussions throughout this paper apply to real bimatrix games, with
(m,n, A˜, B˜) ∈ Rm×n×Rm×n. However, for computational reasons, when discussing the algorithmic
implementations we focus on rational bimatrix games, with (m,n, A˜, B˜) ∈ Qm×n × Qm×n.
We present here a shortened version of the SER1 algorithm that applies when rank(D) = 2.
The cases of rank(D) < 2 are similar, but add complexity to the presentation. See Appendix E for
a discussion of extending ShortSER1 to handle these cases.
Theorem 13. The ShortSER1 algorithm determines if a game (m,n, A˜, B˜) is strategically equiv-
alent to a rank-1 game and returns the strategically equivalent rank-1 game in time O(mn+M(L)).
Proof. Calculating A¯, B¯ is simply a series of vector outer products and matrix subtractions. There-
fore, it takes time O(mn). By Fact 1, determining whether a matrix is rank-1 or not is equivalent to
mn divisions and mn comparisons, and therefore O(mn). As mentioned in Subsection 4.3, finding
an (s, t) ∈ {1 . . . m} × {1 . . . n} such that fs,t(i, j;λ) is not the zero polynomial requires a search
over a space of (m − 1) × (n − 1), thus time O(mn). Calculating the coefficients of fs,t(i, j;λ)
requires at most 4 scalar multiplications and 3 scalar additions/subtractions, which requires time
O(1). Here, we note that the bit length of the coefficients is thus 2L + 1, which is O(L). Now, at
worst solving fs,t(i, j;λ) = 0 is equivalent to computing a square root, which has time complexity
M(L), where M(L) is the complexity of the chosen algorithm for multiplying two L bit numbers
[16]. Furthermore, we note that only one such fs,t(i, j;λ) = 0 must be solved. With candidate
values of λˆ thus determined, checking whether A¯ + λˆB¯ = rj(λˆ)ci(λˆ)
T requires one vector outer
product and one matrix comparison, thus takes time O(mn). Finally, calculating Aˆ and Bˆ requires
a series of vector outer products, scalar-matrix multiplications and matrix additions/subtractions,
which can be done in time O(mn). Thus, overall, the algorithm takes time O(mn+M(L)).
Of course, after calculating the equivalent rank-1 game, one would likely wish to calculate an
NE of that game. The currently known algorithms for calculating an NE of a rank-1 game require
at least one call to a linear program solver [7, 8]. At the time of this writing, solving a linear
program takes more time than O(mn+M(L)). Thus, the overall running time of solving an NE
for a strategically equivalent rank-1 game is not dominated by our algorithm.
6 Conclusion
This paper identifies a class of games that can be reduced to a rank-1 game in polynomial time.
This yields a polynomial time algorithm to determine a Nash equilibrium of a large class of nonzero-
sum games, which may include full rank games. Consequently, we have identified a manifold in the
space of games that are solvable in polynomial time.
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For the future, we intend to analyze nonzero-sum games for which one can derive a rank-1 game
that approximates the original game. This can pave way for new methods to compute approximate
Nash equilibria in bimatrix games.
Algorithm 1 Condensed algorithm for identifying a strategically equivalent rank-1 game
1: procedure ShortSER1(A˜, B˜)
2: Λ← ∅
3: choose (l, k) ∈ {1 . . . m} × {1 . . . n}
4: A¯← A˜− 1mA˜(l) − (A˜
(k) − 1ma˜l,k)1
T
n
5: B¯ ← B˜ − 1mB˜(l) − (B˜
(k) − 1mb˜l,k)1
T
n
6: if rank(A¯+ B¯) = 1 then
7: Λ ∪ {1}
8: else
9: choose (i, j) ∈ {1 . . . m} × {1 . . . n} s.t. a¯i,j 6= 0
10: if b¯i,j 6= 0 then
11: if rank(A¯+
−a¯i,j
b¯i,j
B¯) = 1 then
12: Λ ∪ {
−a¯i,j
b¯i,j
}
13: end if
14: end if
15: if Λ = ∅ then
16: rj(λ)← A¯
(j) + λB¯(j) ; ci(λ)←
1
a¯i,j+λb¯i,j
(A¯(i) + λB¯(i))
17: choose (s, t) ∈ {1 . . . m} × {1 . . . n} s.t. fs,t(i, j;λ) is not the zero polynomial
18: Γ← solve(fs,t(i, j;λ) = 0)
19: for λˆ ∈ Γ do
20: if A¯+ λˆB¯ = rj(λˆ)ci(λˆ)
T then
21: Λ ∪ {λˆ}
22: end if
23: end for
24: end if
25: if (Λ = ∅) ∨ (∄λ ∈ Λ s.t λ ∈ Q>0) then
26: Not strategically equivalent via PAT. exit
27: else
28: γ∗ ← λ ∈ Q>0
29: Aˆ = A˜− (1mA˜(l) + γ
∗1mB˜(l))
30: Bˆ = B˜ −
(
(A˜(k) − 1ma˜l,k)1
T
n + γ
∗(B˜(k) − 1mb˜l,k)1
T
n
)
31: end if
32: end if
33: end procedure
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A Proofs of Auxiliary Lemmas
Proof of Lemma 1. Since p ∈ ∆m and q ∈ ∆m, we have p
T1m = 1 and 1
T
nq = 1. Then, ∀(p,q) ∈
(∆m ×∆n) we have:
pTA˜q = pT(α1A+ β11mu
T)q = α1p
TAq+ β1u
Tq,
pTB˜q = pT(α2B + β2v1
T
n)q = α2p
TBq+ β2p
Tv.
Now, assume that (p∗,q∗) is an NE of (m,n, A˜, B˜). Then, for player 1,
p∗TA˜q∗ = α1p
∗TAq∗ + β1u
Tq∗
≥ α1p
TAq∗ + β1u
Tq∗ = pTA˜q∗ ∀p ∈ ∆m
⇐⇒ p∗TAq∗ ≥ pTAq∗ ∀p ∈ ∆m.
Similarly, for player 2,
p∗TB˜q∗ = α2p
∗TBq∗ + β2p
∗Tv
≥ α2p
∗TBq+ β2p
∗Tv = p∗TB˜q ∀q ∈ ∆n
⇐⇒ p∗TBq∗ ≥ p∗TBq ∀q ∈ ∆n.
Then Definition 2 is satisfied, and (p∗,q∗) is an NE of (m,n,A,B) if and only if (p∗,q∗) is an NE
of (m,n, A˜, B˜).
Proof of Lemma 9. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that fs,t(i, j;λ) is the zero polynomial for
all (s, t) ∈ {1 . . . n} × {1 . . . m}. This implies that for any λˆ ∈ C and for all (s, t) ∈ {1 . . . n} ×
{1 . . . m}, fs,t(i, j; λˆ) = 0. Furthermore, this implies that for any λˆ ∈ C, A+ λˆB = rj(λˆ)ci(λˆ)
T and
rank(A+ λˆB) = 1. In particular, rank(A+B) = 1, which is a contradiction.
B Results From Linear Algebra
In this section, we collect some preliminary results from linear algebra that are used throughout the
rest of the paper. In the first subsection, we present the proof of the Wedderburn rank reduction
formula and some related results. The second subsection discusses certain properties of the vector
space Mm×n that are used in the proofs of results in the subsequent sections.
B.1 Wedderburn Rank Reduction Formula
Proof of Theorem 5. The original proof of (5) is due to Wedderburn [12, p. 69]. We restate it here
for completeness.
We first show that the null space of C2 contains the null space of C1. Pick z such that C1z = 0.
Then,
C2z = C1z− w
−1
1 C1x1y
T
1C1z = 0.
Thus, z is in the null space of C2, which implies that the null space of C2 contains the null space
of C1.
Next, we show that x1 is in the null space of C2, thereby showing that the dimension of the
null space of C2 is one more than dimension of the null space of C1 (since C1x1 6= 0). Consider
C2x1 = C1x1 − w
−1
1 C1x1y
T
1C1x1 = 0.
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Thus, the rank of C2 is one less than the rank of C1.
We now have the following theorem that applies the Wedderburn rank reduction formula to
compute a decomposition of the matrix.
Theorem 14 (Rank-Reducing Process [12, p. 69] [13]). Let C ∈ Rm×n. If rank(C) = γ, then there
exists xk ∈ R
n, yk ∈ R
m, k = 1, . . . , γ such that wk = y
T
kCkxk 6= 0 and the following holds:
Ck+1 = Ck − w
−1
k Ckxky
T
kCk k = (1, 2, . . . , γ) (10)
where C1 = C, Cγ+1 = 0, and rank(Ck+1) = rank(Ck)− 1. In addition, let Wk = w
−1
k Ckxky
T
kCk,
where rank(Wk) = 1. Then, we have
C =
γ∑
k=1
Wk. (11)
Proof. Apply Theorem 5 to C for γ + 1 iterations.
Corollary 14.1. For a matrix M ∈ Rm×n with rank(M) = r, let {Wk} for k = (1, . . . , r) be a
set of rank-1 matrices derived from the rank-reducing process in Theorem 14. Let vku
T
k = Wk =
w−1k Mkxky
T
kMk. Then vk /∈ ColSpan(Mj) and uk /∈ ColSpan(M
T
j ) for all j > k.
Proof. By recursively applying (10) from Theorem 14, we can write Mk+1 as
Mk+1 =M −
k∑
i=1
Wi.
Then, combined with (11) we have
Mk+1 =
r∑
i=1
Wi −
k∑
i=1
Wi (12)
Mk+1 =
r∑
i=k+1
Wi (13)
From (12) and Fact 2, it is apparent that the basis for ColSpan(Mk+1) is formed by removing
[v1,v2, . . . ,vk] from the basis of ColSpan(M). Then, since by definition the basis vectors are
linearly independent, there is no linear combination of [vj ,vj+1, . . . ,vr], such that the linear com-
bination equals vk for j > k. Therefore, vk /∈ ColSpan(Mj) and for all j > k. The same argument
holds for uk /∈ ColSpan(M
T
j ) for all j > k.
Motivated by [13], we now have the following proposition.
Proposition 15. We use here the same notation as in Theorem 5. Let rank(C) = k, with k ≥ 2.
Let {x1,y1} be vectors associated with a rank-reducing process (so that y
T
1Cx1 6= 0). We have
z ∈ ColSpan(CT2 ) if and only if z ∈ ColSpan(C
T) and z ⊥ x1.
Proof. Suppose that z ∈ ColSpan(CT2 ). Then there exists a y2 ∈ R
m such that CT2 y2 = z. Choose
such a y2 and define v2 as
v2 := y2 −
yT2Cx1
yT1Cx1
y1. (14)
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Directly from Theorem 5, we have
yT2C2 = y
T
2C − w
−1
1 y
T
2Cx1y
T
1C
yT2C2 =
(
yT2 −
yT2Cx1
yT1Cx1
yT1
)
C
yT2C2 = v
T
2C (15)
Then by (15), z = CTv2 which implies that z ∈ ColSpan(C
T). From the proof of Theorem 5,
it is clear that x1 ∈ null(C2). Then
yT2C2x1 = v
T
2Cx1 = 0. (16)
Finally, with zT = vT2C we have that z ⊥ x1 by (16).
Now, suppose that z ∈ ColSpan(CT) and z ⊥ x1. Since rank(C) ≥ 2, the ColSpan(CT) is
at least a two dimensional subspace, and thus there exists a y1 ∈ R
m such that CTy1 and z are
linearly independent. Choose such a y1. Choose such a y1. Then, y
T
1Cx1 6= 0 and v2, as given in
(14), is well-defined. Select y2 such that C
Ty2 = z. Then,
v2 = y2 −
zTx1
yT1Cx1
y1 = y2 −
0
yT1Cx1
y1 = y2. (17)
By (15) and (17) , we then have:
yT2C2 = v
T
2C = y
T
2C = z.
Therefore, z ∈ ColSpan(CT2 ).
B.2 The Subspace Mm×n(R)
In this subsection, we recall an essential fact from linear algebra and introduce the the subspace
Mm×n(R), which we define as
Mm×n(R) =
{
M ∈ Rm×n|M = 1mu
T + v1Tn
}
.
The properties of this subspace are essential to formulating the algorithmic solution to our problem
as the matrix D that we are searching for must lie in this subspace.
Let us begin by stating an essential fact on the rank-1 decomposition of a matrix.
Fact 2. For any matrix M ∈ Rm×n with rank(M) = r, one can write M as a summation of
r rank-1 matrices, M =
∑r
1 viu
T
i . Furthermore, [v1,v2, . . . ,vr] is a basis for ColSpan(M) and
[u1,u2, . . . ,ur] is a basis for ColSpan(M
T).
We now proceed to prove that Mm×n(R) is indeed a subspace of the vector space of all real
matrices. Following that, we state some essential properties of the subspace that will be used
throughout the presentation.
Lemma 16. Let Vm×n(R) be the vector space of real m×n matrices and Mm×n(R) be the space of
real matrices such that for all M ∈ Mm×n(R), M = 1mu
T + v1Tn . Then Mm×n(R) is a subspace
of Vm×n(R).
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Proof. We show that Mm×n(R) meets the three properties of a subspace of a vector space. First,
consider u = 0n,v = 0m. Then, M = 0m×n and the zero vector is in Mm×n(R). Secondly, for all
M1,M2 ∈ Mm×n(R),
M1 +M2 = 1mu
T + v1Tn + 1mu
T
2 + v21
T
n ,
= 1m(u
T + uT2 ) + (v + v2)1
T
n .
Therefore,M1+M2 ∈ Mm×n(R). Finally, for all c ∈ R andM ∈ Mm×n(R), cM = 1mcu
T+cv1Tn ∈
Mm×n(R).
Lemma 17. For any matrix M ∈ Rm×n with M 6= 0m×n there is at least one nonzero column and
one nonzero row. Let M (j) and M(i) denote such a column and row. Then, with x = ej and y = ei
we have that 1Tnx 6= 0,1
T
my 6= 0, Mx =M
(j) 6= 0m, and y
TM =M(i) 6= 0
T
n .
Proof. The proof is straightforward and therefore omitted.
Lemma 18. For any matrices C ∈ R(m×n) and M ∈ Mm×n(R) with rank(C) = c, rank(M) = m
such that C =M +
∑c−m
1 ric
T
i :
1. If rank(M) = 2, then 1m ∈ ColSpan(C) and 1n ∈ ColSpan(C
T). In addition, for all x,y
such that Cx = 1m,C
Ty = 1n, we have 1
T
nx = 0,1
T
my = 0.
2. If rank(M) = 1, then either 1m ∈ ColSpan(C), or 1n ∈ ColSpan(C
T) or both 1m ∈
ColSpan(C) and 1n ∈ ColSpan(C
T).
Proof. For claim 1, 1m ∈ ColSpan(C) and 1n ∈ ColSpan(C
T) follows directly from rank(M) = 2
and Fact 2. Then, for all x such that Cx = 1m we have that:
Cx = 1mu
Tx+ v1Tnx+
c−m∑
1
ric
T
i x = 1m,
= (uTx)1m + (1
T
nx)v +
c−m∑
1
(cTi x)ri = 1m,
=⇒ (1Tnx)v = (1− u
Tx)1m +
c−m∑
1
(cTi x)ri.
From Fact 2 we have that v, ri,1m must be linearly independent for all i. This implies that the
equation above is satisfied if and only if 1Tnx = 0, u
Tx = 1, and cTi x = 0 for all i. To prove that
for all y such that CTy = 1n, 1
T
my = 0 apply the same technique to C
T.
Claim 2 follows directly from rank(M) = 1 and Fact 2.
C Strategic Equivalence between Bimatrix Games and Rank-1 Games
In this section, we present the proofs of our main results. For ease of exposition, we break the
result into two theorems–Theorem 6 and Theorem 19–proved in the next two subsections.
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C.1 The case of rank(C˜) equals 3
Proof of Theorem 6. Lemma 18, D ∈ Mm×n(R), and rank(D) = 2 implies that 1m ∈ ColSpan(C˜),
1n ∈ ColSpan(C˜
T). Therefore, there exists x1 such that C˜x1 = 1m. Lemma 17 implies that
there exists y1 ∈ R
m such that yT1 C˜ 6= 0n and 1
T
my1 6= 0. Therefore, we have w1 = y
T
1 C˜x1 6= 0.
Let w−11 y
T
1 C˜ := uˆ
T, then w−11 C˜x1y
T
1 C˜ = 1muˆ
T. After applying the Wedderburn rank reduction
formula, we have
C˜2 = C˜ − w
−1
1 C˜x1y
T
1 C˜ = C˜ − 1muˆ
T.
We now proceed to show that there exists y2 such that y2C˜2 = 1
T
n . We’ve already shown
that 1n ∈ ColSpan(C˜
T). By Lemma 18, we have that 1Tnx1 = 0. Then, by Proposition 15,
1n ∈ ColSpan(C˜
T) and 1Tnx1 = 0 implies that 1n ∈ ColSpan(C˜
T
2 ). Therefore, there exists y2 such
that yT2 C˜2 = 1
T
n .
Let us now show the existence of x2 such that w2 6= 0. By Theorem 5 and the assumption that
rank(C˜) = 3, we have that rank(C˜2) = 2, which implies that C˜2 6= 0m×n. Therefore, by Lemma 17
there exists x2 such that C˜2x2 6= 0m and 1
T
nx2 6= 0. Then, w2 = y
T
2 C˜2x2 6= 0. Let vˆ = w
−1
2 C˜2x2,
then w−12 C˜2x2y
T
2 C˜2 = vˆ1
T
n . Again, we apply the Wedderburn rank reduction formula to obtain
C˜3 = C˜2 − w
−1
2 C˜2x2y
T
2 C˜2 = C˜ − vˆ1
T
n = C˜ − 1muˆ
T − vˆ1Tn .
The assumption that rank(C˜) = 3 and Theorem 14 implies that rank(C˜3) = 1. Furthermore,
the above construction and Corollary 14.1 implies that 1m /∈ ColSpan(C˜3) and 1n /∈ ColSpan(C˜
T
3 ).
Therefore, C˜3 = rˆcˆ
T.
Finally, defining Aˆ := A˜− 1muˆ
T and Bˆ := γB˜ − vˆ1Tn we have that
Aˆ+ Bˆ = A˜+ γB˜ − 1muˆ
T − vˆ1Tn ,
= C˜ − 1muˆ
T − vˆ1Tn ,
= C˜3,
= rˆcˆT.
Therefore, (m,n, A˜, B˜) is strategically equivalent to (m,n, Aˆ, Bˆ) by Lemma 1 and Aˆ+ Bˆ = rˆcˆT,
which is clearly a rank-1 game.
While Theorem 6 handles the most general case of rank(D) = 2, for completeness we still need
to consider the cases of rank(D) < 2. The following theorem addresses those cases.
C.2 The case of rank(C˜) less than 3
Theorem 19. Consider the game (m,n, A˜, B˜). If there exists γ ∈ R>0 such that C˜ := C˜(γ) =
A˜ + γB˜ = D + rˆcˆT where D ∈ Mm×n(R), rank(D) < 2, rank(C˜) < 3, C˜ /∈ Mm×n(R), rˆ ∈ R
m,
and cˆ ∈ Rn then:
1. If rank(D) = 0, Aˆ = A˜ and Bˆ = γB˜.
2. If rank(D) = 1 and 1m ∈ ColSpan(C˜) then Aˆ = A˜− 1muˆ
T and Bˆ = γB˜.
3. If rank(D) = 1 and 1n ∈ ColSpan(C˜
T) then Aˆ = A˜ and Bˆ = γB˜ − vˆ1Tn .
Then the bimatrix game (m,n, A˜, B˜) is strategically equivalent to the rank-1 game (m,n, Aˆ, Bˆ).
16
Proof. For case 1, rank(D) = 0 and C˜ /∈ Mm×n(R) implies that C˜ = rˆcˆ
T. The result immediately
follows from this observation.
For case 2, C˜ /∈ Mm×n(R), rank(D) = 1, and 1m ∈ ColSpan(C˜) implies that C˜ = 1muˆ
T + rˆcˆT.
Then, using a proof similar to Theorem 6, it is straightforward to show that after applying the
Wedderburn rank reduction formula we have
C˜2 = C˜ − w
−1
1 C˜x1y
T
1 C˜ = C˜ − 1muˆ
T,
= rˆcˆT.
Then, with Aˆ and Bˆ as defined in case 2, we have that:
Aˆ+ Bˆ = A˜+ γB˜ − 1muˆ
T,
= C˜ − 1muˆ
T,
= C˜2,
= rˆcˆT.
Therefore, (m,n, A˜, B˜) is strategically equivalent to (m,n, Aˆ, Bˆ) by Lemma 1 and (m,n, Aˆ, Bˆ) is a
rank-1 game. The proof of case 3 is similar to the proof of case 2 and therefore omitted.
D An Efficient Decomposition of C˜ – The Remaining Cases
In Theorem 7, we assumed the existence of a decomposition C˜(γ) =M +D, where D ∈ Mm×n(R)
with rank(D) = 2. In this section, we present the decomposition for rank(D) < 2. This decompo-
sition follows from Theorem 19, thus there are 3 cases to consider.
Theorem 20. Consider the game (m,n, A˜, B˜).
1. If there exists γ∗ ∈ R>0 such that rank(A˜+ γ
∗B˜) = 1 then rank(D) = 0, Aˆ = A˜ and
Bˆ = γ∗B˜.
2. else; select any i ∈ {1 . . . m}. Let A¯ + γB¯ = A˜ + γB˜ − (1mA˜(i) + γ1mB˜(i)). If there exists
γ∗ ∈ R>0 such that rank(A¯+ γ
∗B¯) = 1 then rank(D) = 1, 1m ∈ ColSpan(C˜), Aˆ = A˜ −
(1mA˜(i) + γ
∗1mB˜(i)), and Bˆ = γ
∗B˜.
3. else; select any j ∈ {1 . . . n}. Let A¯ + γB¯ = A˜ + γB˜ − (A˜(j)1Tn + γB˜
(j)1Tn). If there exists
γ∗ ∈ R>0 such that rank(A¯+ γ
∗B¯) = 1 then rank(D) = 1, 1n ∈ ColSpan(C˜
T), Aˆ = A˜, and
Bˆ = γ∗B˜ − (A˜(j)1Tn + γ
∗B˜(j)1Tn).
If any of the three cases hold true, then the game (m,n, A˜, B˜) is strategically equivalent to the rank-1
game (m,n, Aˆ, Bˆ).
Proof. The proof follows from Theorem 19 and the discussion preceding Theorem 7.
E Extending ShortSER1 to SER1
Extending ShortSER1 to SER1 is rather straightforward. One simply has to consider each of
the 3 cases from Theorem 20 in order, and then consider the case from Theorem 7. If any of the
4 cases is true, then the algorithm calculates the appropriate game (m,n, Aˆ, Bˆ) per the case and
terminates. Each case from Theorem 20 is similar to the case from Theorem 7. Thus, each case can
be checked in time O(mn+M(L)). Therefore, considering all 4 cases has time O(mn+M(L)).
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